![]() The purpose of this review is to summarize the main ideas and parts of the book by Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons, an Introduction to Inferentialism. In the fourth chapter, I will determine what the above three chapters have told us about what a Marcusean philosophy of language looks like, and why I feel it is an inadequate account of the relationship between politics and language due to certain issues deriving from Marcuse’s epistemological theory. After doing so, I provide a brief account of Wittgenstein’s argument in the Philosophical Investigations to disprove Marcuse’s criticisms. In the third chapter, I discuss Marcuse’s critique of ordinary language philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations) by comparing it with the argument in favour of clarity in the use of language which is advanced in George Orwell’s "Politics and the English Language" essay. In the second chapter, I determine the defining characteristics of Marcuse’s epistemological theory by critiquing his interpretations of Hegel and his accounts of essence. In the first chapter, I provide an introduction to Marcuse’s thesis in One - Dimensional Man so as to explain his philosophical project and political position to those unfamiliar with his work. This enquiry is thus undertaken over the course of four chapters. What I aim to demonstrate is that Marcuse’s philosophy of language provides a fascinating insight into the interrelation between politics and knowledge which animates his work, indicating the weaknesses of his thesis by doing so. In this thesis, I determine and evaluate Herbert Marcuse’s philosophy of language by discussing his critique of ordinary language philosophy and his epistemological theory. In both cases this challenge gives rise to a logical revolution with respect to the standard logic paradigm. In dialetheism, as well as in Hegel’s philosophy, the challenge of thinking the truth of contradiction is accepted. If we want to endorse an actualizing approach with respect to Hegel’s philosophy, the research on paraconsistent logical systems and especially on dialetheism represents a more promising choice. Brandom’s effort to actualize Hegel’s thought fails, insofar as his account does not involve the essential core of this thought. This very removal of the thesis of the truth of contradiction entails Brandom’s subscription to a project that is wholly different from Hegel’s one. In order to do that, I will try to explain how Brandom misses the self-reflective character of Hegel’s notion of determinate negation, and how this gap prevents him to understand the truth contradictory nature of logical determinations in Hegel’s system. The aim of my paper is to show how Brandom’s reading fails to grasp the true nature of contradiction in Hegel’s thought. In Brandom’s view, Hegelian dialectic is perfectly consistent: contradiction is nothing other than the relation of modally robust exclusion through which a conceptual meaning determines itself as the determinate negation of other incompatible conceptual meanings. ![]() Robert Brandom, in Tales of the Mighty Dead, claims that far from rejecting the law of noncontradiction Hegel radicalizes it, and places it at the very center of his thought. Nevertheless, this is not the only way to look at Hegel’s philosophical picture. If so, his logic is inconsistent and it seems to be condemned to absurdity. Hegel seems to claim that contradictions are true. ![]() The strongest expression of this new conception of logic is the first thesis of the work Hegel discussed in 1801 in order to get his teaching habilitation: contradictio est regula veri, non contradiction falsi. Contradiction or not-contradiction? Brandom’s Interpretation of Hegelian Dialectic According to Horstmann, Hegel thinks of his new logic as being in part incompatible with traditional logic.
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